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Energy Prices, Inflation, and Recession, 1974—75
ABSTRACT
The energy price shock depressed real output by two percent
in 1974 and by five percent in 1975, according to our results.
Prices rose by four percent in 1974 and by another two percent
in 1975. These conclusions are derived from an aggregate model
of the U.S. economy with an explicit role of energy in production.
The distinction between expected and unexpected shocks is an
important part of the model. We also examine monetary and fiscal













The rapid escalation of energy prices in late 1973and early 1974 has a
dominant role in most accounts of thedeep recession and high inflation of
the mfd—1970s. This paper presentsa quantitative appraisal of the response
of real output, prices, and employment to theenergy price shock.It
considers boththesubstitution away from energy as an input toproduction
that occurred because of the shock and alsotraces the monetary and general
mcroeconomjc effects. Two of the most important mechanismsconsidered are
theadverse impact of higher energy priceson the permanent incomes of
consumers and the reduction in investment brought aboutby higher interest
rates. The analysis of these and other channelsof influence of energy
prices is carried outwithin a compact macroeconomic model of the U.S.
economywith an explicit treatment ofenergy.
Our findings suggest that theenergy priceshock depressed real output
bytwo percent in 1974 and by five percent in1975, and so accountsfor at
leasttwo—thirds of the total declinein real output from trend that occurred
in those years. Consumption declinedpermanently by about three percent in
response to the decline in real incomes associated with the Increase in
price of a product which the nation imports, on net. Investmentfell
temporarily but by a much larger percent. Prices rose by fourpercent in
1974 because of the energy shock, and inflationworsened by another two
percent in 1975. Together with the impact of the terminationof price
controls, energy prices can account for all of theenormous acceleration of
inflation observed in 1974, but falls short ofexplaining the continued
inflation in 1975. The deep recession of 1974—75could have been offset
or moderated by suitable policies.In particular, the announcement in 1974
of a monetary expansion to take place in 1975 couldhave postponed the—2-
inflation until 1975 and eliminated the recession. This conclusion
demonstrates our model's ability to handle the expectational issuesthat are
now recognized to be so important in studying the influence ofaggregate
policy, but, of course, the conclusion rests on the stark assumption that
the public would believe an announcement of futurepolicy.Il fiscal
expansion could also havemoderated the recession, but at the cost of
inflation of almost 20 percent. in 1974. The bias inour model toward a
monetary rather than a fiscal offset comes from its incorporation of a full
treatment of the adverse effect of expansionary fiscal policyon aggregate
supply. We also look at the possible success of policies to counteract the
inflationary impetus from the energy shock. We conclude thatcontractionary
money policy would probably not have been capable of fully offsettingenergy
inflation, and only an impracticably large fiscal contraction would have
done the job.
Our work follows in the footsteps of a number of innovative earlier
studies. One of the first to predict the recession as a result of the
energy shock seems to have been Robert Gordon (1974). A number of later
studies have followed. Some of these have made important theoretical
contributions, like Gordon (l975a), E. Phelps (1978), Solow (1978), and
Findlayand Roderigues (1977). Others haveemployed quantitative models to
simulatethe 1974—75 experience. These include Pierce and Enzler (1974),
Berner et al. (1975), Perry (1975a, b), Eckstein (1978), Fair (1978), Klein
(1978), and from a slightly different perspective Hudson and Jorgenson
(1978). Contributions of the moreinformal type include Haberler (1976),
Serot (1978), and Okun (1975). Thepresent paper is, to our knowledge,the
first attempt to give a unified treatment of the issues associated with
factor substitution on the one hand and monetary and general macroeconomic— 3-.
aspects on the other. We have done this byconstructing a medium-sized
macroeconomic model of the U.S. with an explicit treatmentof energy. The
modeling of energy demand is similar to the variousgeneral equilibrium
energy-economy models (cf. e.g. Hudson and Jorgenson (1977) exce0t thatour
model has a simpler, one—sector structure. Theprice of energy is taken as
exogenous, which is convenient for studying the macroeconomic effects.
The macroeconomic structure of our model includesa financial system,
which enables us to study variousaspects of inflation and monetary policy.
The model incorporates the hypothesis of rationalexpectations, but it is
also somewhat Keynesian in treatingmoney wages as predetermined in the short
run.. In a purely classical economy wherewages clear the labor market
•instantaneously, an unexpected energy price increase would reduc thelevel
of output as a way of substitutingaway from energy. Because of an accelerator
effect on investment, this impact would belarger in the short than in the
long run. However, there would be no effect onemployment or prices. When
the price of one factor,energy, increases, the price of other factors,
especially the wage, would fall to offset it. Full employment shouldalways
prevail, and the price level should be linked directly to themoney stock.
In our model, on the contrary,wages respond slowly to unexpected changes
in energy prices (and to all other surprises in theeconomy). During the
period following an energy price increase but before theaccommodating change
in the wage, labor is priced too high for fullemployment. Furthermore,
with wages sticky, an energy price increase increasesthe price level, so
that the real money supply is lowered, which hasan additional contractionary
effect on the economy. Our model dealsexplicitly with these aspects of the
effect of an energy price shock; investment and interestrates play an
important role in the relation between the stickywage rate and the-4-
resulting levels of prices, output, ard employment.
When energy is partly imported, as in the U.S. of the 1970s, another
consideration links output and employment to an unexpected increase inenergy
prices -—higherprices make the U.S. poorer and so reduce the level of
consumption in real terms.. Often this is compared to the imposition of a
tax on U.S. consumers. with the proceeds going to foreigners. As the U.S. is
made poorer, energy—supplying nations become richer. They acquire claims
upon the U.S. and face the choice of accumulating the claims (as government
or corporate bonds, stocks, direct investments and so on) or cashing them in
for goods produced in the, U.S. Our model does not attempt to explain the
choices' of oil producers in this regard, but uses a guess that oil producers
spend a relatively small fraction of their new income on U.S. goods. This
seems consistent. with observations on actual behavior in recent years.—5—
II. The Model
The results of this paper are. obtained by simulation of a macro model of
the U.S. economy with explicit treatment ofenergy. The model was con-
structed on the basis of the one used by Hall (1978a), but containssome
important extensions and revisions. The present model treats theeconomy as
having two. sectors, goodsand energy. Only the goods sector is fullyrepre-
sented in the model. Energy is used as an input to the goods sector and is
thought of as primary energy, such as crude oil, natural gas at the welihead,
and coal at the minemouth. For simplicity, there is a single price ofenergy,
though it should be recognized that this is only a rough approximation. The
price of energy is viewed as exogenous, and what cannot be supplied by the
domestic energy sector is imported. The price elasticity of domesticenergy
supply is not considered here.
The goods sector combines labor, capital, andenergy to produce goods.
The, term "goods" covers all sorts of goods and services and includes finished
energy products such as gasoline and electricity. Total goods production is
allocated among consumption, investment in the goods sector, government
expenditures, net export of goods, and deliveries to the energy sector. It
differs from real GNP by the amount of the last item, which is small, and
net eergy imports.
Within this sector, the critical elements of the model are the tech-
nology constraint, the price equation, the specifications of the investment.
process and wage determination, including lags; the consumption function;
and the demand function for money.
The technology constraint is represented in the form of a unit cost
function
q(e1t 1'E' K' (1)-6—
where w is the aggregate wage rate, the price of energy, and the nominal
rental price of capital. is specified as a translog function and has the
following properties. The own price elasticity ofenergy demand is about
—0.3, and the partial elasticities of substitutionare about zero for capital
and energy, unity for capital and labor, and aroundone half for energy and
labor. These are long—run elasticities; short-run behaviorismodeledby
specifying K as the shadow price of existing capital.Thelow value for the own
elasticity of energy in the aggregate is supported by evidenceby Mork (l973a)
and by casual reading of post—1973 data. The unitaryelasticity of substi-
tution between capital and labor is stronglysupported by the evidence of
Berndt (1976) and many other authors. For thecorresponding elasticity
between capital and energy, strikingly differentestimates can be found in
various parts of the literature.' Despite new insights andattempted recon—
ciliations,2 the issueseems to remain a subject of controversy. Our choice
of a zero elasticity is partly based on the evidence of Hudson andJorgenson
(1978). Although their model has capital-energy complementarity for the
manufacturing sector, substitutability in service industries and interindustry
shifts in final demand gives a net effect on capitalintensity of the
1973-74 energy price increase that is very close to zero. Wehope to pursue
this issue at a later stage.
The overall price leve, defined as themoney price of goods., is
determined as standard unit cost, described by the price equation
(1 —T)P=(e1tw°,Ps,, PV) (2)
where T is a tax parameter for indirecttaxes. The function 4 is thesame as
1Cf.e.g., Berndt and Wood(1975)and Griffin and Gregory (1976).
2Cf Berndt and Wood(1979)and Field and Gribenstein (1977, 1978).—7—
in (1), but the arguments are slightly different. First, fluctuations inthe
efficiency wage due to cyclical variations in productivity, are excluded from
the price equation (2) where as the technology constraint (1) includes them.
Secondly, the capital price used in the price equation is a long-runaverage
of the real rental price times the price level rather than the actual nominal
price as in (1). This formulation corresponds with the following important
findings of the price equation literature: (1) Apart from the effect via
wages, fluctuations in demand have little or no effect on the price level;1
(2) prices show no sensitivity to cyclical fluctuations in productivity;2
and (3) transitory fluctuations in interest rates do not affect prices.3 In
addition, this specification seems to give a sensible estimate of the partial
impact on the price level of an energy price increase, namely the share of
energy in variable cost.
Investment demand is derived from the demand for capital. However, in
the short run, the model assumes that the economy's ability to adjust the
capital stock is limited. Part of the investment in the next fewyears is
already committed today and cannot be adjusted in response to new informa-
tion. Specifically, this is modeled by treating capital as anaggregate of
m categories, such that the quantity of category jneedsto be determined
j- 1years in advance. Each category enters symmetrically in the technology
model; but the categories are imperfect substitutes in production, since
otherwise all investment would be concentrated in the category with the
shortest lead time.In the year of the energy shock, investment in m -1
categories is committed already, whereas investment in the last category is
'Cf. Gordon (1970, 1971,1977), Nordhaus (1972), Hall (1979).
2For an alternativeinterpretation of this observation, see 1ork (l97Rb).
3Cf.e.g. Gordon (l975b), pp. 643—44.-8-
determined by the demand for capital of thatcategory as determined by present
and expected future prices and demand. Thenext year, another category
becomes "flexible" until all capital and investmentis determined by post-
energy shock forces after four years. This formulation, which isadapted
from Hall (l978a), does justice to thephysical lags in the investment
process without introducing arbitrary lags for expectation formulation)
The lag in wage determination is incorporated ina similar way, except
that it is the nominal wage, not thequantity of labor services, that is com-
mitted in advance. When wages are set, they clearthe labor market., or come
as close as they can given current information about future demandfor labor.
When unexpected events occur, such as thedoubling of the price of energy
considered here, the demand function for labor determinesthe level of em—
ployment, which may then be well below the supply of labor. Thiscan be
interpreted as a characterization of the Keynesian hypothesis ofwage
rigidity and is an attempt to embody the view that the labor marketachieves
equality of supply and demand in the long run but that theprocess takes
time. It implies a kind of Phillips curve for theeconomy. However, in
place of the expected inflation term that has been the source ofso much
instability and conceptual ambiguity in the literature on thePhillips curve,
expectations of future labor demand are formed using the model itself. In
particular, feedback from prices to wages occurs in the model to the extent
that price increases signal current or future increases inthe demand for
labor (as they typically do).
This formulation, set forth by Hall (l978a), has beenextended in two
1The length andshape of the investment lag is exogenous in our model. An
endogenous speed of adjustment, as in Lucas (1967) might have beenmore
appropriate.—9—
directions. First, a cost of living increasehas been added to the pre—
connitted wage rate. Specifically, for eachpercentage point of unexpected
price inflation, the Coniiitted wage rate is raisedby 0.25 percent in the
same year and another 0.25 percent in theyear after. Roughly, this corres-
ponds to a 50 percent escalation clause witha six month lag, assumed to
reflect the time needed for data collection.The inclusion of this feature
is justified by the widespreadoccurrence of such clauses in the U.S. labor
contracts (cf. Mitchell (1978))as well as the theoretical argumentby Hall
and Lilien (1979) that efficient laborcontracts will have this feature.
Furthermore, it allows for a positive feedback fromenergy prices to wages
in the short run. Since it turns outthat an energy price increase lowers
the demand for labor permanently,
however, this positive feedback is counter-
acted by a tendency towards lowerwages in the longer run.
The other extension is an adjustment fn thecomitted wage rate to in-
corporate cyclical movements in labor productivity. Thisfeature makes the
model obey Okun's law but has few otherimplications and thus will not be
discussed in detail here.
Consumption in the model is determined bypermanent income. Consumers
are viewed as looking into the future to evaluate theirfuture incomes, and
then choosing a growth path ofconsumption that is the highest feasible given
expected future income. The behavior ofconsumption has the character de-
scribed by Hall (1978b) ——consumersalways plan a constant growth rate for
consumption. When new information arrives, they makean immediate once—and—
for-all adjustment to the level ofconsumption. We assume that consumption
is unaffected by real interestrates, in the sense that the rate of growth
of planned consumption does not dependon the interest rate. Note that the
assumption in Hall (1978a) that consumption isunresponsive to all economic-1 0—
events is replaced by an explicit dependence on permanent income.
Government expenditure and net export of goods are taken to be
exogenous. Among other things this means that, rather than modeling the
behavior of petroleum exporting countries, we usean outside estimate of
their demand for U.S. goods.
In the money demand function, the major issue is thespecification of
the variable that measures the dollar volume of transactions.The use of
nominal gross national product for thispurpose is one of the many reasons
that macroeconomic models in existence in 1973were unable to deal effectively
with the energy price shock (cf. the remarks by Pierce andEnzler, op. cit.,
p. 16) -—nominalGNP subtracts imports and so cancels out much of the effect
of higher energy prices. We use the dollar volume ofoutput from the goods
sector as a proxy for transactions. This variable makessense in view of the
fact that much of the money stock is in the hands ofconsumers, not businesses.
We neglect the small contribution to the demand formoney that might come
from the energy sector (recall that allenergy passes through the goods
sector on its way to final demand).
A technical presentation of the model is given in the Appendix.—11—
HI. Actual Performance of the U.S.Economy, 1973—77
The upper panel of Table 1 summarizes theactual performance of the U.S.
economy over the last five years. The data have beenrecast so as to fit
into the sectoral and conceptual frameworkof our model. Gross output is
defined as total GNP minus GNPoriginated in the energy sector (defined as
co&1 mining and oil and gas extraction),plus the value of primary energy
input to the goods sector.1 Investment is definedas gross private domestic
investment except structures formining exploration, shafts, and wells, and
mining and oilfield machinery. Rather thanfollowing the practice of double
deflation, which can be misleading overa period with changing relative
prices, all nominal figures were deflated bya coninon price index. We used
theConsumer Price Index for thispurpose and for general description of the
price level over the period. We preferred the CPIto the GNP deflator
because it corresponds better to our definitionof gross output.2'3
rn spite of the differences in definition,the numbers of Table 1 are
very close to the standard macroeconomic variables. This
similarity is,
however, the result of several factorsworking in different directions. Thus,
the decline in gross output is madelarger than the fall in GNP by the
exclusion of the domestic energy sector, whereasthe increased value of
energy imports worked in the opposite direction. Furthermore,
deflation by
1The value ofprimary energy and GNP in the energy sectorwere taken from
Mork's data base (cf. Mark et. al. (1978)).Some extrapolation was
necessary for 1976 and 1977; the possible extrapolationerrors are not
likely to have been important.
noted by Pierce and Enzler (op. cit.),import price increases affect the
GNP deflator only through the increases in theprices of domestically
produced substitutes. There is no direct effect becauseimports are
substracted off in the computation of GNP fromgross output data.
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the CPI made for a somewhat larger decline in real output in 1974.
Thelargest decline in real output took place from 1973to1974 with a
growthrateof -1.5 percent. The depth of the recession was, however,
reached in 1975 with real production 2.3 percent below its 1973 level. This
was also the year of record high unemployment rates. As for the components
of output, the decline in investment in 1974—75 was most spectacular,as was
its rapid rebound during the recovery. However, the stagnation ofconsump-
tion was equally significant. Net exports of goods increasedsubstantially
in 1974 and 1975 but declined in 1976 and 1977, apparently as a result of
the worldwide recession.
The price level movements over this period are well known. The first
jump came with higher food prices in 1973 with another jump, twice as large,
partly caused by higher energy prices, following in 1974. Although inflation
slowed down somewhat after these jumps, prices continued to rise at high rates
in 1975 and the following years. The development of the value ofenergy
imports from 1972 to 1974 illustrates the transfer of wealth from the U.S. to
oil-exporting countries. Part of the increase is due to an increase in
quantity. This accounts for about half of the increase from 1972 to 1973.
For the following year, however, the quantity increase was minimal. Thus,
the wealth transfer may be roughly approximated as a $19 billion annual
transfer of income.-14—
IV. Estimates of the Energy Price Shock
Our first step was to prepare a base case describing the possible evolu-
tion of the economy from 1973 in the absence of the abrupt increase in the
price, of energy. Table 2 shows the assumptions in the base case and the
model's corresponding projections. The nominal price of energy was assumed
to increase at the same rate as the general price level. For all years except
1974 this was assumed to be 5 percent, which is the natural rate of Inflation
of the model. For 1974 an additional 2 percent inflation was projected as a
resultof the removal of general wage and price controls. The committed
wage rate and the money stock were assumed to grow at 6.3 percent and 6 per-
cent peryear respectively. Investment commitments for 1974 were assumed to
besomewhat lower than investment In the mini-boom of 1973 andto grow
smoothlyfrom then on. The labor force, expressed as the natural rate of
employment, was assumed to grow at about 1 .7percent per year, which is
1 about the same as population growth in recent years.When combined with
alabor productivity growth rate of 1 .2 percent, this gives a total natural
growth rate of slightly below 3 percent. This is lower than the postwar
average but seems well in accordance with recent experience.
Themodel's projections arebased on the absence of any surprises or
shocks. The employment rate is the natural or equilibrium rate, which is
6percent in our model. The wages actually set (the "flexible wage rate")
equal the committed levels; roughly the same is true for investment. Real
output grows smoothly and inflation proceeds at 5 percent.
Table 3presentsthe modePs estimates of the effects of an unexpected
increasein the price of energy starting in 1974. Here the price of energy

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































takes an unexpected jump of 68 percent in 1974 relativeto its value in the
base case. There is an additional but smallersurprise in 1975, so in that
year the price of energy is 105 percent higher than in the basecase. In all
subsequent years the real price of energy is the same as in 1975. These
figures were chosen to approximate the actual events of 1973-75 andare dis-
cussed in more detail below. Note that the increasesare in addition to the
projected increases of 7 and 5 percent respectively in each of the twoyears.
Monetary policy is assumed unchanged from the base case, but the simula-
tion run underlying Table 3 assumes apermanent downward shift in money demand
of 2 percentstarting in 1976in accordance with recent observations) Net
exportsofgoods are assumed to increase but only by a fraction of the
transfer of income from the U.S. to foreignersfollowing the oil price
increase (Cf. Table 1). Specifically, the sum of netexports of goods and
government expenditures is assumed to follow its actual path for 1974—76 and
to grow at a constant rate after that.
Overall Impact
The energy price shock generates a sizeable recession in themodel. The
energy price increase affects the economy via two principal channels. The
first is a permanent lowering of the growth path of theeconomy as a result
of labor-energy substitution. The higherenergy prices induce more labor-
intensive methods of production, but since thesupply of labor is fixed in
the long run, this can be done only by loweringoutput. The reduction in
output carries with it an accelerator-effect on investment.Consumption is
also affected since real income to domesticconsumers is reduced by the
amount of increase of the real value ofenergy imports. This effect is,
1Cf. Goldfeld (1976).-l 8-.
however, mitigated, first by the substitution away from energy, and secondly
by the fact that some of the energy imports are financed by accumulating
claims rather than export of goods. For the same reason, exports ofgoods
is increased, but by less than the increase inenergy imports. All these
effects concern only the real part of the economy; the story told above is
essentially a one—sector version of Hudson and Jorgenson's multisectoral
studies,1 except that our model does notassume that the labor market clears.
More than half of the recession in the model seems explainable thisway.
The other channel is related specifically to the financial sector of the
economy. As wages are largely predetermined when the shock occurs, the
sharp energy price increase causes a jump in the. price level. Consequently,
the transactions demand for money increases; stated equivalently, the real
money supply declines, so that, in Keynesian terms, the LH-curve shifts to
the left. The financial tightening drives up interest rates, thus dis-
couraging investment. The resulting loss in real wealth depresses consump-
tion as well. The fall in real money supply-is furthermore increased by
additional increases in the price level triggered by cost of living
escalators in wage contracts, and by a permanent increase in the real
interest rate of 0.35 percentage points.
The net result of all these forces and their interactions is an extra-
ordinarily high inflation rate combined with a severe recession. For 1974,
the model estimates that the total impact on real output was a reduction of
26 billion dollars, or about 2 percent. This is almost exactly the same
amount as the reduction in consumption, whereas investment decreased by
7 billion and net exports of goods and government expenditure increased by
the same amount. The effect on output is largest in the second and third
10p. cit.
-—19-
years after the shock, in 1975-76, when real output is down by 63 and
54 billion 1972 dollars, respectively. The bulkof this is decreased invest-
ment,especially in 1975; but the 3.3 percent permanent drop in consumption
is sizeable enough.The fall in real output Is acconipanied by a decline in
employment of 2 million workers in 1975 and acorresponding increase in the
unemploymentrate of 1.7 percentage points.
The predicted effect on the price level is substantial inthe first two
years.The monetary expansion implicit in the shift inmoney demand from
1976maintains the effect and Increases it slightly. In termsof rates of
inflation,the effect is byfar largest in 1974 with 4percentage points
added to the inflation rate. It tapers off thereafterand becomes slightly
negative in 1977. The model offers a complete explanation of inflationin
1974, but cannot explain completely the cOntinuedhigh inflation in 1975 and
the following years.
Comparing Table 3 with the lower panel of Table 1, theenergy price
shockappearsto explain about two thirds of the recession in terms of
decline in real output in 1974 and 1975, andpractically all its shortfall
thereafterAs will be shown below, however, a part of theremaining one
third for the first two years can be explainedas a decline in the demand for
consumer durables, which is not treated explicitly byour model. This may
increase the 1974—75 figures from two thirds to aboutfour fifths. The mag-
nitude of these ratios depend, however,crucial.ly on how large the total
recession is thought to be, in other words,what thebase case should be
like. Thus, our base case incorporatesa . billion drop in investment from
1973—74. Also, the natural growth rate in our modelis lower than the post-
war average, but close to the average of the early seventies. We findit-20-
difficult to draw firmconclusionsabout the total magnitude of the
recession.It seems clear, however, that the energy price shock was its
largest single cause; and that, given the assumptions used here,very little
of the behavior of real output is left unexplained.
Consumption
Consumption is determined by permanent income in our model. This, in turn,
is affected mainly by three factors associated with theenergy price increase.
The largest, and perhaps most obvious effect comes from the transfer of income
resulting from the increased value of energy imports. The magnitude of the
transfer is reduced somewhat by substitution away fromenergy; but the
19 billion figure derived in section III may serve as a good approximation.
The second factor affecting permanent income is the recession itself.
The decline in investment induced by the financial tightening representeda
permanent loss of productive capacity and hence income. The third factor
goes the other way and follows from the fact that oil-exporting countries
accumulate part of their new wealth as claims on the U.S. economy rather than
spending it. Since this accumulation is in fact saving, the productive
capacity of the U.S. economy is increased, and hence permanent income)
The simulated consumption path tracks actual consumption quite well.The
exception occurs mainly in 1975, when actual decline was much larger; and a
similar, but much smaller discrepancy is found for 1974. The main reason
for this discrepancy is probably the failure of our model to account
1This result dependscrucially on the assumption that oil exporters will not
attempt to exchange their claims for U.S. goods in the foreseeable future.
If this were expected, the model should have assumed a future increase in
the net export of goods. This wouH have reducedDermanent income for
domestic consumers.—21—
explicitly for the special behavior of expenditures for consumer durables.1
As is well known, a decline in permanent income hasan accelerator-like effect
on the spending on durables. For the present drop in permanent income, the
resulting one—time drop in spending can be estimated roughly as 15 billions.
f it is assumed that one third of this tookplace in1974and the rest in
1975, the consumption level of 1974 is explained fully, and half of thegap is
closed for 1975.2 The authors hope to return to this issue infuture work
with the model.
Itment
Since investment demand is derived from the demand forcapital as an input
to production, the magnitude of the decline in investment in the modeldepends
on the elasticity of substitution between capital andenergy, which we have
assumed to be practically zero. The drop in investment would have beenlarger
with capital-energy complementarity and lower if the twoinputs are substi-
tutes in production. Although our choice of a zeroelasticity is open for
attack from both sides, it does give a good tracking of the actualinvestment
data. We hope to investigate this aspect morecarefully at a later stage.
Price Level
Our model indicates that the effect of theenergy price shock on the
1The mainreason why we did not include this in the model is technical.Adding
consumer durables as a third asset in addition to money and capital would
have added considerably to the complexity of the model because of its
rationalexpectations property, so that the solution method presently used
would have been highly inadequate.
2Thediscussion of this aspect in the literature (cf. Eckstein (1978),Perry
(1975a),Okun (1975)) has concentrated on automobile sales, which dropped
substantially in 1974. One has to be cautious, however, so as not to
confuse income and substitution effects in automobile demand, sincea good
deal of the change that took place was from larger to smallercars, and
possibly from automobiles to other, less energy—intensive consumer goods.—22-
general price level was quite substantial.In fact, it can be claimed that the
extraordinary inflation in 1974 can be explained completely by this event and
the removal of general price controls. Table 4 shows a decomposition of in-
flation in 1974 and 75. Out of the 11 percent inflation in 1974, the model
attributes 2.8 percentage points, or about one fourth of the total, to the
direct impact of higher energy prices. Another 0.7percentage points are attri-
buted to the permanent increase in the real cost of capital,1 and a similar
contribution comes from wage increases. The wage increase itself is aweighted
average of the increase due to cost of living clauses and the decrease in the
market-clearing wage. This decrease is somewhat lower than itwouldhave been
if the monetary expansion implicit in the shift inmoney demand had not been
assumed.2 Adding all these effects.gives a total contribution to inflation
of about 4 percentage points. Together with the effect of price decontrol
and natural inflation in the model, this gives an inflation rate in 1974 that
is very close to the observed increase in the consumer price index.
The 1975 inflationary experience is not so easily explained by our model.
There was another direct impact of energy price increase about half as much as
in 1974, and wages continued to increase somewhat in the model. There is,
however, a gap of 2percentage points of inflation for 1975 that we are unable
to explain as a result of the energy price shock.
The impact on the price' level depends of course crucially on the measure-
ment of the energy price increase itself. It is worthwhile to consider this
problem in a little more detail. The price of energy covers all forms of
'We are aware that previousattempts to find an interest rate effect in the
price equation have not been very successful (cf.sectionIIabove).Our
priceequation reflects this finding by excluding the current real interest
rate and using a long—run average instead. Failure to include this long—run
average would have produced a serious logical inconsistency in our model by
forcing firms to run permanent deficits.
the other hand, this shift also gives a slight permanent reduction in
thereal interest rate, which tends to reduce the price level.—23-.
Table 4
Decomposition of Inflation 1974-75
1974 1975
Total increase in inflation explained
by the-model 4.2 1.8
Direct impact of energy price
increase 2.8 1.4
Effect via increased long-run
cost of capital 0.7 0.0
Effect of wage changes 0.8 0.4
Cost of living increases 0.8 0.7
Reduction in equilibrium wage -0.1 -0.3
Removal of price controls 2.0 0.0
11Natural" inflation 5.0 5.0
Total inflation of the CPI 11.0 9.1
Residual -0.2 2.3-24-
primary energy: crude oil (and imported petroleum products), natural gas,
coal, and hydroelectric and nuclear power. The observed crude oil prices for
this period were affected by the price equalization program. It has been
argued, however, that this program was hot fully effective in regulating the
price of oil to final users because the prices of petroleum products are largely
determined by the world market.1 Rather than taking sides in this discussion,
we looked at the published prices of petroleum products, calculated backwards
what the increase in crude prices would have been to give the observed product
price increase, and termed this the effective increase in crude oil prices.
This was 110 percent from 1973 to 1974 and 16 percent the following year. For
coal, the wholesale price index was assumed satisfactory, which gave 52 and
16 percent increases for the two years, respectively. Hydra and nuclear elec-
tricity were evaluated as the fossil fUel cost it replaces, and their prices
were assumed to follow that of coal. The most serious problem existed for
natural gas because the observed prices obviously did not clear the market in
the relevant period. At this point we made the assumption that the effective
price of gas followed that of crude oil. We then computed a preliminary energy
price index as a Divisia index of the coal and oil prices. This gave an increase
in the price of primary energy of 99 percent in 1974 and 16 percent in 1975.
We recognize, however, that, because of regulations and controls, only a part
of the 1974 increase reached the final users in that year. This is particularly
true for fuel used for electricity and utility gas, because energy deliveries
from utilities typically cannot be resold in the open market. Consequently, we
assumed that the effective real increase in the price of energy in 1974 was only
80 percent of what our preliminary index indicated, but that our energy price
level for 1975 was fully effective. This gave the energy price numbers in
Table 3.
1Cf C. Phelps and Smith (1977).—25-.
V. Comparison of Models
Table 5 presents the estimates of six differentmodels of the impact of
the energy price shock on inflation,aggregate output, investment, and con-
sumption. For results other than our own in Table 3, thesources are
Eckstein (1978) for the DRI model,Perry (1975b) for the FRB and University
of Michigan models, Pierce and Enzler (1974)for the FIPS model, and Fair
(1978) for Fair's model. Making the estimatescomparable offered some
problems. First, inflation is measured by different indicesin the various
models. This is discussed further below.Secondly, the sector division of
our model is somewhat different from the rest. Weassume, though, that
relative changes in GNP and grossoutput of our model are roughly comparable,
and that the same is true for investment inthe goods sector as against
overall investment. Thirdly, since the modelshave different baseline
projections, deviationsfor the real variables are presented aspercentages
of the actual levels. A special problemwas encountered for the MPS model,
which was simulated from 1967 ratherthan l974. For this model, deviations
forthe real variableswere computed in percent of the actual levels of 1967
etc., but presented as resultsfor 1974 and the following years. Finally,
differentdeflators had been used, resulting in realfigures in 1958 and
1972 as well as 1973 dollars. Using the 1972deflators of the three years,
these were all converted to 1972 dollars.
Because of the different measures used, it is difficultto compare the
estimates of the inflationary impact of theenergy price increase. As
discussed above in section II, the GNP deflatortends to give a lower esti-
mate than measures of consumer prices, becauseimports are subtracted off in
the construction of the GNP deflator. Thisdifference becomes apparent in
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Consumer Price Index as well. Furthermore, Fair'sestimate is based on a
slightly different definition of the shock in that hecompares actual inflation
to predicted inflation with all import pricesgrowing at 6 percent per year.
However, even accounting for this difference, Fair's estimatesseem unreasonably
high, implying that import prices were responsible for threequarters of all
inflation in 1974. Comparing our model to theremaining ones we find that,
even after accounting for the conceptual differences, our estimate of the
inflationary impact is substantially higher, whereas the other modelsagree
fairly well among themselves.
Given the disagreement about the effect on inflation, theestimates of the
real effects are remarkably close. All models predicta significant recession
as a result of the energy price shock, but no model depicts this shockas its
single cause. It may also be noted that the more recently publishedresults,
whose authors benefited from hindsight, indicatea deeper recession. Ibpefully,
this means that economists have learned some lessonsover the past few years.
The real effect of the energy price shock is different inour model not
so much in magnitude as in structure. With a slightly unconventionalformula-
tion of money demand1 and a relativelyhigh interest elasticity of investment
demand, the drop in investment becomes the mostsignificant feature of the
recession in our model. Indeed, our model predictsa drop in investment for
1975 tnat is three times as large as in the DRImodel and very close to what
actually happened. The Michigan model has figures similar to the DRImodel
for investment, and the FRB model somewhat less.Pierce and Enzler do not
report results for investment separately; but judging from thechanges in
1Pierceand Enzler have a similar formulation butapparently did notget thesameresults.-28-
consumption and GNP in their paper, the effect on investment cannot have
been large. Fair does notreportany results on. GNP components.
All models predict significant effects on consumption)it is
interesting to note that models with more or less Keynesianconsumption
functions give results that are very similar toour permanent income formula-
tion with rational expectations. It is clearlysuggested by the numbers of
Table 5 that the assessment of the real effects ofenergy price changes is
quite robust with respect to many basic model assumptions.
Eckstein's effect onconsumption is based on comparison with unrevised actual
figures published at an early date.Ifwecompare with the revised figures,
hisnumbers for consumption would decrease to -.1.4 percent in both 1974 and
1975.This is the result of the fact that, from March to July 1976, actual
growthin consumption for 1975 was revised upwards from 0.9 to 1.9percent.
As Eckstein pointed out to us in private conversation, thismeans that data
revisions were almost as large as the effect of theenergy price shock.-29—
VI. Policies to Offset the Macroeconomic Impacts of the Energy Shock
The effects of the energy price shock on output, employment, and prices
could have been altered by manipulation of macroeconomic policy instruments.
For example, with monetary or fiscal expansion, the effects on output and
employmentcould have been attenuated or even eliminated. Table 6 shows the
results of two such policies, both aimed at stabilizingemployment at around
6 percent in all years.
The two policies are expansion of the money supply and a government
spending program. The monetary expansion alternative seems by far the most
attractive of the two. It gives higher real growth and much lower infla-
tionary response than the fiscal expansion. The necessary monetary expansion
has a somewhat curious form: no extraordinary money growth is needed in the
year of the shock, if an announcement is made that money supply will grow by
an extra 2.4 percentage points the year after, 1.2 percentage points in the
third year, and then return to its normal growth rate. The inflationary
response of this policy is also somewhat surprising, in that inflation is
predicted to go down rather than up in the year of the shock. The explana-
tion for this is that monetary expansion lowers the real interest rateper-
manently and that this effect dominates the Phillips curve effect for this
year. Obviously, this response is a conjecture and has not been inferred
directlyfrom the data.
Fiscalexpansion can also stabilize the unemployment rate. However, a
significant part of the employment effect in this case is a substitution
effect as fiscal expansion increases the real interest rate substantially.
Real growth suffers. Furthermore, the resulting inflation rates are















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































second year occurs with the opposite sign, but this does not change the over-
all picture very much. Finally, there is a problem of how to carry out this
policy. As a pure spending program it could be done as shown in Table 6,
but it is clear that the amounts of extra spending needed are extremely
large. In practice, tax cuts have been more popular among political decision
makers; but there seems no simple answer to how an increase in spending
equivalent to the one in Table 6 could have been obtained within a framework
of permanent income consumption.
The other possible policy goal is of course to stabilize inflation. On
the surface, monetary restraint seems the most obvious candidate for this
purpose. However, although monetary policy is the perfect i.nstrurnent for
affecting the price level inthelong run In our model, the short run is not
so simple. It turns out that the monetary contraction needed to depress wages
sufficiently in our model also pressures the real interest rate upward perma-
nently, so that the negative effect on prices is offset. We wereable to
simulate a monetary response that brought inflation rates for the first two
years back to their base case levels only by introducing a monetary expansion
in the third year that would be even more extreme than the contraction needed
in the first two. Although this did the trick of keeping down the real
interest rate, we do not find this alternative credible for actual policy-
making. Hence, we conclude that eliminating the energy—induced inflation in
1974—75 by monetary policy would not have been practically feasible.
Since fiscal policy has the opposite effect on interest rates, it seems
more attractive for this purpose. Table 7 shows the results of such a simula-
tion. However, the necessary policy response isunrealisticallylarge; indeed,
a near 35 percent surplus in the federal budget would have been needed in
1975.Weconclude that any attempt to eliminate the increased inflation in

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































VII. Summary and Conclusions
We have constructed and simulated a relatively small macroeconomic model
of the United States with energy. The important features of the modelare a
technology constraint with the three inputs capital, labor, andenergy and
with a flexible functional form; a money demand function withgross output
as the transaction variable; a permanent income consumption function;
rational expectations; and some important short run rigidities, notably in
wage and price determination and in the investment process.
Large and unanticipated changes in the price of energy are found to have
substantial disruptive effects on the economy. We have simulated the 1973—74
energy price increase and found the following effects: the rate of inflation
was increased by four percentage points in 1974 and near two percentage
points in 1975. Real output was decreased by 26 billion dollars (1972) in
1974, 63 billion in 1975, and around 50 billion in each of the following
three years. For 1975, the relative decline was near 5percent. The effect
was found to have been largest for investment, but consumption decreased by
a significant 3.3 percent in each year. The effects on employment can be
expressed as an increase in the unemployment rate of near one percentage
point in 1974, rising to 1.7 percentage points in 1974, and tapering off
thereafter. The energy price shock was clearly a major cause of the 1974-75
recession and inflation. Other forces were present, however, suchas the
removal of the last price controls of the Economic StabilizationProgram,
and the slowdown of investment activity after the preceding miniboom. The
collective effect of these and other possible factorsseem, though, to have
been substantially less than that of theenergy price shock.
Our findings carry obvious implications for the expected effects of-34-.
current events in the world market for oil. At the time of this writing it
is not entirely clear how large the price increase is going to be and how
much of it will be unanticipated. It seems likely that the oil price increase
will be substantially smaller than in 1974; however, the aggregate cost share
of energy is larger in the U.S. today than it was. five years ago, which
suggests a larger effect per percentage point of energy price increase. The
authors plan to follow up the present paper with a study of these events.— 35-.
Appendix:Technical Presentation of the Model
The model is a monetary growth model of a type similar to that of
Sidrauski(1967),but with energy as a third factor, rigiditiesIn theshort








The money market and themarket for energy clear in each period; the three
other markets may or may not clear, depending on rigidities.
The rigidities are of three kinds. First, for the goods market, a
standard unit cost pricing rule is assumed rather than marginal cost pricing
in the short run. Secondly, only a fraction of the capital stockcan be
adjusted in the short run; and the adjustable part is assumed an imperfect
substitute to the unadjustable part. Thirdly,wages are downward rigid.
The dynamic part of the model is made up by capital accumulation and
permanent—income consumption on the one hand and by rationalexpectations
price dynamics on the other. The latter is derived from the assumedequality
of the real return to capital and the real interest rate.
Technology Model and Factor Markets
The technology constraint for the goods sector has the form of a unit
cost function













































Cost shares and demand elasticities are variable. Computing cost shares for
1975 using base case and energy shock case prices, and taking means, the

























Factor demand under cost minimization is determined by Shephard's lemma:
i=L,K,E
The supply of energy is assumed to be infinitely elastic at theexogenously
givenprice. Rigidities in the investment process are modeled in the
following way. There are m categories of capital; the quantity ofcategory i
isdetermined j — 1 years in advance. The variouscategories enter
symmetrically in the technology model but are imperfect substitutes, or else
all investment would be concentrated in thecategory with the shortest lead
time. A simple Cobb—Douglas form is chosen for the capital submodel
K= K1h/m.l/
(m = (A.3)
Inthe year of the shock, thequantities of the m —1 last categories are
predetermined; by symmetry, they all have the level i, whereas the first
category has the level R1. The year after, m — 2 categories have the level
K2 and two have K2, etc. Defining bt as the fraction of categories having
their level determined by post-shock conditions ("f1exible capital),(A.3)









The quantity of flexible capital is determined by the demand equation
Kt =Kt"KtK(e REt' Ktt (A.6)
where Vt is output.
Since the quantity Kt ("rigid" capital) is predetermined, its price is
determined by the equation
=(PKt1Kt)K(e1t "Et' Ktt (A.7)
Investment in rigid capital is derived simply from capital accumulation:
=t
—— t-i( =0.1) (A.8)
The average amount of flexible capital in the absence of any investment is
[bti k1 +(bt
-bti)ti]/bt






and total investment is
It =bI+(1-bt)it (A.l0)
Wage rigidity is modeled analogously except that here it is price,
not quantity, that is predetermined. A similar subfunction is postulated,
L =L111
...Li/n (n =6) (A.li)
Wages are thought of as determined by contracts. All contracts last n years,
and contracts are renegotiated by one category each year. Wages are
negotiated so as to clear the market in expectation. The market-clearing
wage renegotiated after the shock is denoted ,andfull employment is-39-
given as the exogenously given natural level of employment 1
Contracts negotiated before the shock set a starting wage level of
to be paid in the absence of unanticipated inflation. If unanticipated




— inthe year of the shock, and
(l/2)(Pt — + -t—lt-1
thereafter.
is the expected price level, specified as the base case forecast. Thus,
defining as the fraction of categories with wages renegotiated after the
shock, the average wage per worker is
*1-ft1
The efficiency wage over the cycle differs from w because of cyclical
fluctuations in labor productivity. This component of productivity is
approximated by the following formulation. Consider the market for a
category of labor whose contract has not been renegotiated. Disequilibrium
in this market can be measured by the relative difference between the
actual nd the market-clearing wage, i.e., by the ratio
w/w
The tightness in the labor market as a whole depends also on how many
categories have had their wages renegotiated. The following measure is
proposed:
1This formula and (A.ll) should riot bethought of as strictly technological
relationships, but rather as a convenient way of modeling wage rigidity.-40-.
Thus,the average wage rate per efficiency unit is definedas
U h(l_f) w =w(w/)
,h=0.8 (A..14)
This is the wage rate that enters in the factor demandequations, whereas
w is used in the price equation (cf. below).




1t(w/w)L(e_U1t REt' Ktt (A.l6)
and total employment is
Lt =ftLt
+(1— (A.17)
Clearly, when <1,the labor market will clear only ifw=
TheGoods Market
The demand for goods consists of consumption, investment,net exports
of goods, and government expenditures. The latter twoare considered
exogenous, and investment demand is discussed above. Consumption follows
the permanent income hypothesis. This is modeledas
=gt
where g =0.029is the sum of the rate of growth of the labor force and the
rate of labor productivity growth.C0 is determined endogenously as
described below.
Goods are produced by capital,labor,and energy subject to the produc-
tion possibility constraint (A.l). After a shockoccurs, some categories
of capital have predetermined levels so that the firms'marginal cost-41 -
scheduleis upward sloping in the short run. Rather than treating this as
the supply schedule for goods, however, the model specifies a standard unit
cost pricing rule and assumes that firms passively supply any amount of
goods demanded at that. price. The pricing rule takes the form of the price
equation
(1 -T)P=(e1tw0,E'' T=0.065 (A.18)
where v is a long—run average of the real rental price of capital,Pis the
price of goods, and ratax parameter accounting for indirect taxes. is
the same function as in (A.1), but its first and third arguments are w° and
P rather than w and Since is a market-clearing price for a
(partially) fixed factor, It fluctuates procyclically whereas PV does not.
Thus, there is no demand effect in the price equation.
The Market for Money
The financial sector of the economy is compressed into one equation of
our model, namely the money demand equation. Its form is
tn(PY/M)=+ 11r+2t
, = 2.0, =0.019 (A.19)
Money supply, M, is thought of as supplied exogenously by the monetary
authority and, in the absence of specific policy actions, to grow at a
constant exponential rate. Money and capital are considered perfect









Here v. =Kt'tis the real rental price of capital ,dtis the investment
tax credit, and o is the rate of tax on capital as a fraction of its value.-42-
Compact Mathematical Statement of the Model
CapitalAccumulation:
=+ (1 - )[(bt1/bt)k1+((btbti)/bt)it1], (M.l)
(M.2)
Demandfor Capital:
Kt = kt"KtK(elw, SEt' "Ktt (M.3)
K'K K(e' w, REt' Ktt (MA)
bt_ l-bt
Kt Kt Kt (M.5)
Demand for Labor:
c= (wt1t)e1tL(e' w, REt' Ktt' (M.6)



















=gtg = ,C0chosen so as to attain
steady state for real economy in the long run (M.14)
Distribution of Output in goods market:





v long run average of Kt't
Money Market Equilibrium:
zn(PtYt/Mt) =o
+ + u2t, Mt =M0emt,
m =0.058 (P1.17)
Equality of Nominal Return to Capital and Nominal Interest Rate:
rt =v./(l
—dt)
— — e+ zn((l —dt+i)Pt+i)
—£n((l—dt)Pt),
Vt =Kt't (P1.18)-44-
Dynamic Solution of the Model
The solution algorithm assumes initial guesses for the initial levels of
consumption and price level and for the long run average of the real cost of
capital V. The initial level of V is given historically. The model can then
be solved period by period, and (M.l), (M.2), (M.l4) and (NL18) give the
dynamiclinks between periods.
Since it turns out that the roots of this system are unstable, the
solution based on initial guesses will give a finite path of price level and
capital stock only by chance. The model therefore searches over several
values of initial price and consumption levels until it finds a pair that
gives a finite solution. This process limits the initial price level to a
very tight interval and determines the permanent income level of consumption.
A final set of iterations makes the value of V consistent with the steady—
state value of v.-45—
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